You left yourself wide open! My own recommendations for the Supreme Court?
These are taken primarily from the enacting statement and Article III. Governed by the text, the Court has no power over it, so Jacobson had no power to affect the legal force of the text's enacting statement. They may not construe the text as a contract alone or o…
You left yourself wide open! My own recommendations for the Supreme Court?
These are taken primarily from the enacting statement and Article III. Governed by the text, the Court has no power over it, so Jacobson had no power to affect the legal force of the text's enacting statement. They may not construe the text as a contract alone or omit relevant text.
The Supreme Court is not final. Congress can repeal a ruling by a constitutional statute. Their power to legislate for the nation is the highest power we vest in government. If their reasoning and the Court's differ, Congress controls.
Interpretation is seldom necessary or proper but when it is the first step should be applying any needed Declaratory text the Constitution does not repeal. As the document that incorporated the nation and states as entities the Declaration can never be entirely repealed.
The Posterity clause bars limiting the power of future benches of the Court with extrabehavioral rules, doctrines, or tests. Their liberty to read the supreme law for us must remain as perfect as when the first Justices lent their readings of the text to their colleagues' first constitutional cases.
By this token, precedent does not bind the Supreme Court. If you know of a decision free of precedent later than Amendment XIII, I'd appreciate your citing it. Constitutional avoidance has led us far from law, as was its intent during Reconstruction. Supreme jurisprudence applies the Constitution and constitutional federal laws and treaties. Most cases appealed to the Supreme Court can be decided by applying these three without analysis, let alone interpretation.
A court, including the Supreme Court, should cite a prior opinion only as far as their reasoning would duplicate it, and if a case can be decided entirely on canonical precedent without falling into error there is no just cause for accepting it. That's one of the few textually acceptable limits on the obligation expressed in Article III section 2's "all." Before reading your The Shadow Docket I believed the certiorari doctrine was anticanonical except for decisions free of judicial error. You convinced me the office includes encouraging full or partial resolution below by timing and partial joinder of constitutional matters, implied in the text by allowing only one Supreme Court but unlimited inferior courts.
However, when the Supreme Court does reject a case it must provide the people its reasoning. The Petition clause requires it, including strategies or informal rules so we can decide whether to petition for their review. Lower courts will then need the Court's guidance. Congress also needs them to make laws governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction or governing judicial behavior. It is neither necessary nor proper for the Supreme Court to make these itself. Nor may a public office be privatized. The Judicial Conference of the United States is a private organization that has far overstepped its authority. Only Congress may establish laws necessary and proper for the execution of any power vested in the text. (And the people's petitions for review of good behavior must go directly to the House.)
Mandatory precedent violates Posterity's liberty interests in every court. They are of course fallible, and since error is especially common when divisions of power are reviewed, placing any officers on pedestals perniciously violates the Titles of Nobility clauses.
Our system of regional stare decisis also violates the Union mandate. We have state courts for regional matters with the underused Full Faith and Credit, Equal Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection under the Laws to unify them. The decisions limiting these clauses' use sets court above text, which no court may do. We need Congress to establish a procedure for the Supreme Court to remand to them for legislation any matter a court has lawfully excluded from any of the three. The same procedure should apply when a statute is held too broad or vague for use. Separation of powers means each branch should do its own work. The ability to remand congressional matters to Congress would separate the powers properly, prevent injustice, and even shorten the docket. States should consider the same.
Courts should enforce the Titles of Nobility clause by keeping titles properly attached to their officers. Not even a general remains a general when no longer serving; they will be the first to admit the need for the Titles of Nobility clauses to security against coups. Barring the title "the Honorable" from any American would also help, as would legislative and judicial correction of anything that tends towards a caste system in governance. The Titles of Nobility clauses' bar is easily seen in the speed with which the popular expression "meritocracy" led to the expression "political class" and from there, shockingly, to "ruling class." The people reserved that to ourselves and our instrument the Constitution.
Hmmm, the Starbucks staff is starting to look impatient. All for now.
Before citing Amdt VII in response, everyone, please note that it expressly bars common law in all criminal cases and in appellate review of questions of law. Judge-made law is also barred by Article I section 1. How? The Constitution is not a letter or a speech but a governing text ordained by the people. By vesting a power it expressly bars any competing power (absent amendment). To put it another way, to vest a power also vests a jurisdiction, a borderline within which that power is exercised. No exercise of that power outside that border is lawful.
You left yourself wide open! My own recommendations for the Supreme Court?
These are taken primarily from the enacting statement and Article III. Governed by the text, the Court has no power over it, so Jacobson had no power to affect the legal force of the text's enacting statement. They may not construe the text as a contract alone or omit relevant text.
The Supreme Court is not final. Congress can repeal a ruling by a constitutional statute. Their power to legislate for the nation is the highest power we vest in government. If their reasoning and the Court's differ, Congress controls.
Interpretation is seldom necessary or proper but when it is the first step should be applying any needed Declaratory text the Constitution does not repeal. As the document that incorporated the nation and states as entities the Declaration can never be entirely repealed.
The Posterity clause bars limiting the power of future benches of the Court with extrabehavioral rules, doctrines, or tests. Their liberty to read the supreme law for us must remain as perfect as when the first Justices lent their readings of the text to their colleagues' first constitutional cases.
By this token, precedent does not bind the Supreme Court. If you know of a decision free of precedent later than Amendment XIII, I'd appreciate your citing it. Constitutional avoidance has led us far from law, as was its intent during Reconstruction. Supreme jurisprudence applies the Constitution and constitutional federal laws and treaties. Most cases appealed to the Supreme Court can be decided by applying these three without analysis, let alone interpretation.
A court, including the Supreme Court, should cite a prior opinion only as far as their reasoning would duplicate it, and if a case can be decided entirely on canonical precedent without falling into error there is no just cause for accepting it. That's one of the few textually acceptable limits on the obligation expressed in Article III section 2's "all." Before reading your The Shadow Docket I believed the certiorari doctrine was anticanonical except for decisions free of judicial error. You convinced me the office includes encouraging full or partial resolution below by timing and partial joinder of constitutional matters, implied in the text by allowing only one Supreme Court but unlimited inferior courts.
However, when the Supreme Court does reject a case it must provide the people its reasoning. The Petition clause requires it, including strategies or informal rules so we can decide whether to petition for their review. Lower courts will then need the Court's guidance. Congress also needs them to make laws governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction or governing judicial behavior. It is neither necessary nor proper for the Supreme Court to make these itself. Nor may a public office be privatized. The Judicial Conference of the United States is a private organization that has far overstepped its authority. Only Congress may establish laws necessary and proper for the execution of any power vested in the text. (And the people's petitions for review of good behavior must go directly to the House.)
Mandatory precedent violates Posterity's liberty interests in every court. They are of course fallible, and since error is especially common when divisions of power are reviewed, placing any officers on pedestals perniciously violates the Titles of Nobility clauses.
Our system of regional stare decisis also violates the Union mandate. We have state courts for regional matters with the underused Full Faith and Credit, Equal Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection under the Laws to unify them. The decisions limiting these clauses' use sets court above text, which no court may do. We need Congress to establish a procedure for the Supreme Court to remand to them for legislation any matter a court has lawfully excluded from any of the three. The same procedure should apply when a statute is held too broad or vague for use. Separation of powers means each branch should do its own work. The ability to remand congressional matters to Congress would separate the powers properly, prevent injustice, and even shorten the docket. States should consider the same.
Courts should enforce the Titles of Nobility clause by keeping titles properly attached to their officers. Not even a general remains a general when no longer serving; they will be the first to admit the need for the Titles of Nobility clauses to security against coups. Barring the title "the Honorable" from any American would also help, as would legislative and judicial correction of anything that tends towards a caste system in governance. The Titles of Nobility clauses' bar is easily seen in the speed with which the popular expression "meritocracy" led to the expression "political class" and from there, shockingly, to "ruling class." The people reserved that to ourselves and our instrument the Constitution.
Hmmm, the Starbucks staff is starting to look impatient. All for now.
Before citing Amdt VII in response, everyone, please note that it expressly bars common law in all criminal cases and in appellate review of questions of law. Judge-made law is also barred by Article I section 1. How? The Constitution is not a letter or a speech but a governing text ordained by the people. By vesting a power it expressly bars any competing power (absent amendment). To put it another way, to vest a power also vests a jurisdiction, a borderline within which that power is exercised. No exercise of that power outside that border is lawful.