I have not, and won't have time to, read Bray's argument for the suitability of the birthright case to making a determination on the viability or appropriateness of universal injunctions. Vladeck states in his rebuttal that "First, assuming there are five votes to limit or get rid of universal injunctions, doing so here would, in my view…
I have not, and won't have time to, read Bray's argument for the suitability of the birthright case to making a determination on the viability or appropriateness of universal injunctions. Vladeck states in his rebuttal that "First, assuming there are five votes to limit or get rid of universal injunctions, doing so here would, in my view, look really bad given that the Court refused to do so in the Career Colleges and Schools of Texas and Corporate Transparency Act cases..." and "Second, I also think that the birthright citizenship cases provide uniquely powerful proof for why universal injunctions are valuable."
It seems to me that both of these arguments assume an outcome that is not necessary. Following Bray's lead, where the merits (or lack thereof) are so clear, this is a great opportunity for the Court to specify exactly where the line for appropriate universal injunctions should be drawn. Perhaps the Court would argue that this case is, in agreement with Vladeck , that birthright citizenship is exactly the type of case where universal injunctions are appropriate while other cases, where the immediate damages are not as widespread or significant, should have limited injunctions that apply only to the specific focus of the case at hand. Perhaps both Bray and Vladeck are correct but addressing different aspects of the same argument.
I have not, and won't have time to, read Bray's argument for the suitability of the birthright case to making a determination on the viability or appropriateness of universal injunctions. Vladeck states in his rebuttal that "First, assuming there are five votes to limit or get rid of universal injunctions, doing so here would, in my view, look really bad given that the Court refused to do so in the Career Colleges and Schools of Texas and Corporate Transparency Act cases..." and "Second, I also think that the birthright citizenship cases provide uniquely powerful proof for why universal injunctions are valuable."
It seems to me that both of these arguments assume an outcome that is not necessary. Following Bray's lead, where the merits (or lack thereof) are so clear, this is a great opportunity for the Court to specify exactly where the line for appropriate universal injunctions should be drawn. Perhaps the Court would argue that this case is, in agreement with Vladeck , that birthright citizenship is exactly the type of case where universal injunctions are appropriate while other cases, where the immediate damages are not as widespread or significant, should have limited injunctions that apply only to the specific focus of the case at hand. Perhaps both Bray and Vladeck are correct but addressing different aspects of the same argument.